daily

2026-07-23
1

Great cities of the world – Enniscorthy and Blacktown

Wexford Local · original → · 8/10 · Local Wexford: Enniscorthy sister cities celebration and civic event
[image →]At the Civic Reception on the roof top of Enniscorthy Castle this evening were CLLR JOHN O’ROURKE, Leas-Cathaoirleach Enniscorthy Municipal District Council, CLLR LISA McDONALD,…
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At the Civic Reception on the roof top of Enniscorthy Castle this evening were CLLR JOHN O’ROURKE, Leas-Cathaoirleach Enniscorthy Municipal District Council, CLLR LISA McDONALD, Cathaoirleach Wexford County Council , MAYOR BRAD BUNTING of Blacktown City, New South Wales, Australia, and CLAIRE LAWLESS, Enniscorthy Municipal District Manager. (Pic; WexfordLocal.com)

By Dan Walsh at Enniscorthy Castle

It was time to celebrate the Sister Cities agreement, also known as a twinning ceremony, between Enniscorthy and Blacktown, near Sydney, Australia, with a roof top Civic Reception at Enniscorthy Castle this evening.

Claire Lawless, District Manager, acted as master of ceremonies and welcomed everybody including Minister James Browne TD, Cllr John O’Rourke, Leas-Cathaoirleach Enniscorthy Municipal District Council, Cllr Lisa McDonald, Cathaoirleach Wexford County Council, Cllrs Trish Byrne and Barbara-Anne Murphy, Carolyne Godkin, Director of Services and from Blacktown City Council Mayor Bunting, Kevin Poilly, Manager of Events and Sister Cities; Donna Wallace, Manager of Greenspace Services; and Blacktown City Youth Ambassadors Caiden Bond and Laura Corvalan.

Leas-Cathaoirleach of Enniscorthy Municipal District Council Cllr John O’Rourke said “This evening’s reception provides an opportunity not only to formally welcome our guests from Blacktown City Council but also to celebrate the enduring links between our communities and to look towards future opportunities for co-operation and friendship.

“This return visit is another important step in building lasting connections through friendship, cultural exchange and tourism,” said Cllr O’Rourke, who added; “Thank you for making the journey to Wexford. We sincerely value our friendship with Blacktown and look forward to many more years of collaboration.”

Mayor Bunting said; “It’s only new but I already feel this relationship is going to grow further and further because of genuine interest from both sides of the world to grow.

Speaking directly to Cllr O’Rourke, Mayor Bunting said; “John, I would be more than happy to invite you back to Blacktown because I think it’s important that we do travel. We have stopped listening to the media regarding its a junket! These things aren’t about a councillor going overseas and having a holiday. These things are real connections, things that we can learn from each other to make sure each city is a better place for learning from other places around the world.

“So again, thank you for your great hospitality here in Enniscorthy and I look forward to the next couple of days and a bigger brighter future for our cities,” concluded Mayor Bunting.

Cathaoirleach of Wexford County Council Cllr Lisa McDonald also expressed her appreciation and supported strengthening the relationship between Blacktown City Council and Wexford in the years ahead.

There were many exchanges of gifts including a magnificent design of the Enniscorthy town crest by Martin’s Jewellery, Wexford, while Mayor Bunting presented Cllr McDonald with a didgeridoo, a traditional wind instrument from Indigenous Australian culture, played by vibrating the lips and using circular breathing to produce a continuous drone.

The pleasant ceremony concluded with entertainment from the Martina Leacy Academy and the Kay Keeley music and dance group.

2

OpenAI’s accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened

Simon Willison · original → · 8/10 · AI critical: OpenAI accidental cyberattack on Hugging Face
OpenAI’s accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened 22nd July 2026 This story is wild. The short version: OpenAI were running a cybersecurity test against an…

OpenAI’s accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened 22nd July 2026 This story is wild. The short version: OpenAI were running a cybersecurity test against an unreleased model, with the model’s guardrail features turned off. Rather than solve the test, the model broke its way out of OpenAI’s sandbox, then found exploits to break in to Hugging Face, all so it could cheat on the test by stealing the answers. Along the way it helped make the strongest case yet for how the imbalance of model availability is hurting our ability to secure our software. Here’s what happened We currently have three documents to help us understand what happened here. - ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks? is a paper published on 11th May 2026 describing ExploitGym, a new eval suite for LLM-powered agent systems. - Security incident disclosure — July 2026 by Hugging Face on 16th July 2026 describes how they detected an attack from an “agentic security-research harness—used LLM still not known” that breached some of their systems. - OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation from OpenAI on 21st July 2026 confesses that it was their agent harness that did this, and that they’re working with Hugging Face to clean up the mess. ExploitGym I hadn’t seen the ExploitGym paper before and it’s a really interesting one. Authors from UC Berkeley, the Max Planck Institute, UC Santa Barbara, and Arizona State designed a new benchmark for evaluating models on their ability to turn a reported vulnerability into a concrete exploit. OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google provided feedback and helped run the benchmark against their models. The benchmark “comprises 898 instances derived from real-world vulnerabilities that affected popular software projects”—including the Linux kernel and V8 JavaScript engine. Here’s the paragraph that best represents their benchmark results: Among all configurations, Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 achieve the highest success counts (157 and 120 successes, respectively), demonstrating that current frontier agents can exploit a substantial subset of real-world vulnerabilities under controlled conditions. GPT-5.4 also solves a notable 54 tasks, placing it in an intermediate tier. The remaining model–agent pairings solve fewer than 15 tasks each, underscoring that end-to-end exploitation remains challenging and sharply differentiates today’s frontier systems. Notably, Claude Opus 4.7 achieves fewer successes than Claude Opus 4.6 despite being a newer checkpoint, and does so at substantially lower cost on the full set. Trace inspection reveals that Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.1 Pro frequently conclude early after judging the target vulnerability non-exploitable. The paper also describes the approach they took to preventing the agents from cheating by going outside the parameters of the test. This becomes relevant in a moment! Outbound connections are restricted to a curated allowlist that permits routine package installation (Ubuntu apt repositories and PyPI) and fetching the toolchains required for building V8. All other external endpoints are blocked. The paper concludes with this (emphasis mine): Our results show that autonomous exploit development by frontier AI agents is no longer a hypothetical capability. While current agents are not yet reliable across all targets, they already exploit a non-trivial fraction of real-world vulnerabilities, including complex targets such as kernel components. This rapid emergence is itself a central finding, showing that capabilities that would have seemed implausible are now present in deployed frontier models. An important detail here: this paper isn’t about discovering vulnerabilities; it’s about being able to take those vulnerabilities and turn them into working exploits. When Anthropic first restricted access to Mythos back in April they talked about this capability as well. A model that can act on vulnerabilities is a lot more dangerous than one that can just discover them. One of the ways Fable differs from Mythos is that it’s more likely to refuse to weaponize vulnerabilities in this way. I get the impression the US government did not understand that distinction when they banned Fable last month. The Hugging Face incident The first hint we got of the attack was in this blog post by Hugging Face on 16th July 2026: A malicious dataset abused two code-execution paths in our dataset processing (a remote-code dataset loader and a template-injection in a dataset configuration) to run code on a processing worker. From there, the actor escalated to node-level access, harvested cloud and cluster credentials, and moved laterally into several internal clusters over a weekend. I hope they release more details about the code that pulled this off. I’m assuming this means packages using the datasets library, a Hugging Face project for bundling up and sharing datasets on their platform. That library used to execute arbitrary code but has been steadily locked down over time, with the 4.0.0 release in July 2025 removing the trust_remote_code=True flag entirely. Assuming the attack used that library it must have either abused pickle serialization in some way, found some other non-obvious code execution path, or (most likely) specified datasets<4.0.0 as the dependency. The campaign was run by an autonomous agent framework (appearing to be built on an agentic security-research harness—used LLM still not known) executing many thousands of individual actions across a swarm of short-lived sandboxes, with self-migrating command-and-control staged on public services. This was a sophisticated attack! Then Hugging Face hit a wall: they tried to use “frontier models behind commercial APIs”—I’m guessing from Anthropic and OpenAI—to help analyze the attack, and were blocked: When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers’ safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker. They switched to their own self-hosted instance of MIT licensed GLM-5.2 and it helped them figure out what was going on. This indicated a fundamental asymmetry between the defending team and the (so-far unknown) attacker: We do not know which model powered the attacker’s agents, whether a jailbroken hosted model or an unrestricted open-weight one; either way, the attacker was bound by no usage policy, while our own forensic work was blocked by the guardrails of the hosted models we first tried. As a useful indicator of how seriously they took the attack: [...] Finally, we have also reported this incident to law enforcement agencies. So who was responsible for this “autonomous agent framework”? It turned out to be OpenAI themselves. The OpenAI confession Five days later, on July 21st, OpenAI revealed the culprit. They had been running the ExploitGym benchmark against a new, as-yet undisclosed model, and that model had been operating way outside its intended parameters (emphasis mine): After investigating, we now know that this particular incident was driven by a combination of OpenAI models — including GPT‑5.6 Sol and an even more capable pre-release model, all with reduced cyber refusals for evaluation purposes — while being internally tested on a benchmark [ExploitGym] of cyber capabilities. [...] We estimate maximal cyber capabilities by running this evaluation without production classifiers used to prevent models from pursuing high-risk cyber activity. Our benchmarks run in a highly isolated environment, with network access constrained to the ability to install packages through an internally hosted third-party software that acts as a proxy and cache for package registries. The models identified and chained vulnerabilities across OpenAI’s research environment and Hugging Face’s production infrastructure to obtain test solutions directly from Hugging Face’s production database. All evidence suggests that the models were hyperfocused on finding a solution for ExploitGym, going to extreme lengths to achieve a rather narrow testing goal. It’s pretty clear what happened here. OpenAI removed safety filters for an in-progress model, locked it up in a sandbox and told it to solve the ExploitGym problems. Given the absence of guardrails there was nothing to prevent the model from attempting to break out of that sandbox, break into Hugging Face, and read the answers from there instead. OpenAI’s sandbox used the now common pattern of allowing access to an allow-list of sites related to installing additional packages via a controlled proxy. In OpenAI’s words: While operating in our sandboxed testing environment, our models spent a substantial amount of inference compute finding a way to obtain open Internet access, in pursuit of solving the evaluation problem. To gain access, the models identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability (which we’ve now responsibly disclosed to the vendor) in the package registry cache proxy. With this access, our models performed a series of privilege escalation and lateral movement actions in our research testing environment until the models reached a node with Internet access. So step one was to break out onto the public internet. The model then broke into Hugging Face to find the answers: After gaining Internet access, the models inferred that Hugging Face potentially hosted models, datasets and solutions for ExploitGym. Knowing this, the model searched for and successfully found ways to gain access to secret information that it could use to cheat the evaluation. In one example, the model chained together multiple attack vectors, including using stolen credentials and zero-day vulnerabilities to find a remote code execution path on the Hugging Face servers. Chaining together multiple attack vectors is exactly the kind of thing these new models can do, where previous generations of models might have failed. I wrote last month about how Claude Fable is relentlessly proactive, when I noticed it spinning up custom web servers and deploying CORS tricks on my own laptop just to help debug a WebKit CSS issue. It turns out relentless proactivity is the defining trait of this new generation of Mythos-class models. If you set them a goal and give them a way to get there, even inadvertently, they will figure it out. Resist the temptation to write this off as a stunt There will inevitably be some people who dismiss this story as a dishonest marketing trick by OpenAI to make their models sound terrifyingly effective. I found 81 instances of the term “marketing” in the Hacker News discussion of the incident. To those people I say pull your heads out of the sand—you’re now including Hugging Face in your conspiracy theories, just so you can deny the crescendo of evidence here! The best models we have today have the ability to both find and exploit new vulnerabilities. The ExploitGym paper itself concludes that “autonomous exploit development by frontier AI agents is no longer a hypothetical capability”, and this incident is a perfect example of exactly that. The asymmetry is increasingly frustrating One of the most infuriating details of this story is how Hugging Face, faced with an accidental and aggressive attack from one of OpenAI’s models, were unable to then turn to OpenAI’s models to help them fend off the attack. The frontier models we have access to are increasingly being constrained in how much they can help us protect our software, heavily influenced by the US government’s ongoing threat of export controls. Claude Fable 5 wouldn’t even proofread this article for me! It insisted on downgrading me to a less capable model. Meanwhile open weight models from China such as GLM-5.2, Kimi 3 and the new Qwen 3.8 Max appear to have none of these restrictions—and any restrictions that do exist can likely be fine-tuned out of them by modifying the weights These constraints are meant to make us safer. I think there’s a risk that they are having the opposite effect. More recent articles - A Fireside Chat with Cat and Thariq from the Claude Code team - 21st July 2026 - Kimi K3, and what we can still learn from the pelican benchmark - 16th July 2026

3

7,500 children waiting for first contact from disability teams

Breaking News Ireland · original → · 7/10 · Irish citizen issue: HSE disability services waiting lists affecting children
Figures from the HSE show 7,500 children are waiting for first contact with a Child Disability Network Team (CDNT) at the end of April. This is a drop from the 8,200 children who were waiting for…

Figures from the HSE show 7,500 children are waiting for first contact with a Child Disability Network Team (CDNT) at the end of April. This is a drop from the 8,200 children who were waiting for first contact at the end of March. Of the 7,500 children waiting for first contact at the end of April, 4,776 are waiting for over a year. The Regional Healthcare Area (RHA) with the highest number of children waiting for first contact is HSE Dublin South East, with 1,946 children on waiting lists. Of those children, 1,381 are waiting over a year for first contact. This RHA covers Carlow, Kilkenny, South Tipperary, Waterford, Wexford, and most of Wicklow. HSE Dublin Midlands, which covers Dublin South City and West and Dublin South West, Kildare, West Wicklow, Laois, Offaly, Longford, and Westmeath, has 1,933 children waiting for first contact. This includes 1,423 waiting for first contact. HSE Dublin and North East, which covers North Dublin, Louth, Meath, Monaghan, and most of Cavan, has 1,743 children waiting for first contact. Of those, 1,091 are waiting for over a year. At HSE Midwest, covering Clare, Limerick, and North Tipperary, 1,035 children are waiting for first contact, with 604 waiting over a year. HSE West and North West, which provides care for Donegal, Leitrim, Sligo, West Cavan, Mayo, Galway and Roscommon, had 127 children waiting for first contact at the end of April. A report in October 2025, there was an 18 per cent vacancy rate for positions within CDNTs, with 457 posts unfilled. The HSE are the biggest lead agency over the 93 CDNTs, providing 43 of them. Enable Ireland provides 20, while Brothers of Charity provide six. The HSE said the Whole Time Equivalent (WTE) of the CDNTs has increased by 28 per cent since October 2023, with an extra 448 staff on teams, of which 320 are Health & Social Care Professionals on CDNTs across the country. The National Service Plan 2026 outlines growth of 1,050 WTE during 2026. The number of sanctioned posts and related funding available to recruit into any Disability posts will be within the overall WTE of 23,664 by the end of 2026.

4

Gorey Primary Care Centre remains a priority

Wexford Local · original → · 7/10 · Local Wexford: Gorey Primary Care Centre infrastructure project
By Dan Walsh Fine Gael TD for Wicklow Wexford Brian Brennan has cautiously welcomed progress on the Gorey Primary Care Centre project but has vowed that he will continue to keep pressure on to…

By Dan Walsh

Fine Gael TD for Wicklow Wexford Brian Brennan has cautiously welcomed progress on the Gorey Primary Care Centre project but has vowed that he will continue to keep pressure on to finally drive this project to completion.

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DEPUTY BRIAN BRENNAN TD

In response to a Dail Question tabled by Deputy Brennan by Minister for Health, Jennifer Carroll MacNeill, the Minister has confirmed that a preferred bidder for the project has been identified and that the project is now progressing through internal review and approval processes within the HSE.

Welcoming the progress, Deputy Brennan said; “It is almost unfathomable that a town with the demographic profile of Gorey does not yet have a Primary Care Centre to serve some of the most basic health needs of the community.

“This project has been talked about for years and has had several false starts so it is absolutely imperative that we get it right for once and for all.

“Since taking office, I have been in constant contact with the Minister to ensure that progress continues and have investigated all possible options to help with getting this over the line.

“Gorey is one of the fastest growing towns in Ireland and as such it is struggling to meet the day-to-day health needs of its people.  In addition, Courtown/ Riverchapel is now Wexford’s fifth largest town, and an estimated population increase in the summer of 40,000 people from Castletown to Cahore puts huge strain on existing services.

“The development of a Primary Care Centre will help to address some of the issues faced in Gorey and bring services directly into the community that have been lacking up to now.

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Minister for Health, Jennifer Carroll MacNeill TD

In the Minister’s response she detailed the prior issues with this project and outlined the current position in the process as follows; “As previously communicated, the need for a new Primary Care Centre in Gorey had been previously identified. A tender process had been undertaken, and a Preferred Provider had been selected. Unfortunately, the selected Preferred Provider encountered difficulties regarding the economic viability of the proposed project, resulting in the collapse of this process.

In conclusion, Deputy Brennan said; “I am optimistic that this project is on the right track but there can be no room for complacency.  The people of Gorey deserve to have access to a state-of-the-art Primary Care Centre to meet their day-to-day healthcare needs in the community and I will continue to do everything in my power to make this happen.”

5

Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing?

Hacker News · original → · 7/10 · AI: pelican benchmark analysis, critical AI perspective
Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing? For the past few years, Simon Willison has tested every major LLM release with the same prompt: “Generate an SVG of a pelican riding a bicycle”. What began as a…

Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing? For the past few years, Simon Willison has tested every major LLM release with the same prompt: “Generate an SVG of a pelican riding a bicycle”. What began as a tongue-in-cheek benchmark has become one of the most famous informal benchmarks in AI. Simon’s pelican-on-a-bicycle results are often among the most upvoted comments on Hacker News threads announcing new releases from AI labs. The benchmark is now famous enough that there’s plenty of discussion about its usefulness and about whether AI labs might be benchmaxxing1 on it. When billions or even trillions of dollars are at stake, and a strong result could help persuade users, wouldn’t it be tempting to pelicanmaxx your model just a bit? I wanted to find out, so I put together a small experiment. I generated 1,008 SVGs across seven frontier models, scored them with an LLM judge, and used Claude Fable 5 for the analysis. This article presents the results. All the code is available on Github. How I tested it I built a grid of 8 animals × 6 vehicles = 48 prompts, where the famous prompt is one cell: - Animals: pelican, flamingo, heron, otter, raccoon, antelope, whale, cat - Vehicles: bicycle, unicycle, skateboard, scooter, plane, boat Every prompt uses almost identical phrasing to Simon’s, only switching the animal and vehicle. The animal and vehicle selection wasn’t done in a very rigorous manner, but I tried to vary both similarity to the original prompt and difficulty. Flamingo and heron are quite similar to pelicans; cat, raccoon, and otter are easy cases; antelope is hard; and whale is as different as you can get. I tested seven models through OpenRouter: GPT-5.6 Terra, Claude Sonnet 5, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Grok 4.5, Qwen3.7-Max, GLM-5.2, and DeepSeek V4 Pro. I generated 3 samples per prompt, at temperature 1.0, requesting the same reasoning effort from every model. That resulted in 1,008 SVGs. Then I ran each image through a three-stage pipeline: - Rendering: Each SVG is rendered to PNG. If a model returns no SVG or one that fails to render, I regenerate until it produces a valid one, and record the number of attempts. There were only 11 retries across the 1,008 generations. - Judging: GPT-5.6 Luna scores each image with 1-5 ratings for the animal, the vehicle, and the coherence of the action. When I rank animals or vehicles below, I use the matching rating on its own. When I need one number per image, I use the average of the three, which I call the judge score. - Feature extraction: For a more detailed analysis, I also passed each rendered image to Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, which recorded the animal and vehicle it recognized, which way the subject faces, and an open-ended list of scene elements. My hypothesis is that if a lab trained on the benchmark, it should show up in some combination of the pelican row scoring above what the animal deserves, the bicycle column scoring above what the vehicle deserves, or the specific pelican-bicycle cell beating both. Evidence #1: The pelicans on bicycles don’t look any better Before any scoring, the simplest test is to look at the images yourself. Pick a lab to see everything it drew, with the judge’s score under each image (click to open full size): I looked through the images myself before running the analysis below. Nothing jumped out at me. I couldn’t find a case where the pelican-bicycle images looked noticeably better than the rest of that model’s grid. Maybe in GLM-5.2’s first sample it felt slightly better than the rest, but that batch also produced a pretty cool heron on a skateboard, so I cannot say for sure. Otherwise they look like the rest of what each model draws, and the labs that draw good pelicans on bicycles also do a good job drawing other animal-vehicle combinations. But this test is hard to replicate, and everyone will have a different opinion. So I wanted something more quantitative, which is why I opted for the method detailed above. Evidence #2: Labs are not better at drawing pelicans Here’s the mean animal rating per animal, pooled across all models: The pelican is 6th of 8, behind cat, whale, raccoon, heron, and antelope. If AI labs were training on the benchmark, you’d expect pelicans at the top. Instead they’re in the bottom half. All seven labs draw cats, whales, and raccoons better than pelicans. Of course, a pelican may simply be harder to draw than a cat. A lab could train on pelicans and still not push them past the easy animals, so this ranking alone can’t rule that out. I’ll adjust for difficulty in Evidence #4. Evidence #3: Labs are not better at drawing bicycles Bicycles fare even worse. They sit second from last, in a near-tie with planes, which come in last: If labs were training on the benchmark, you’d expect bicycles near the top of this ranking. They’re not. However, the same caveat applies here. A bicycle is harder to draw than a skateboard: it needs two matching wheels, a frame that reaches both axles, handlebars, a seat, and pedals. The judge flags a missing or disconnected one of those on 2/3 of the bicycle images. You can train on bicycle images and still not do a great job relative to simpler vehicles. One note on the plane, though: I should’ve picked “airplane” instead of “plane” because models often read it geometrically. They drew the animal standing on a flat surface instead of flying an aircraft. The plane is the only vehicle where the feature extractor sometimes found no vehicle at all (25 of 168 images, against zero for the other five), and 20% of plane images scored a 1 or 2 on the vehicle rating, against 5% for bicycles and none at all for boats, scooters, or skateboards. Evidence #4: Labs are not better at drawing pelicans on bicycles, even adjusting for difficulty Put the two together and the “pelican on a bicycle” ends up near the bottom of the ranking, at #42 of 48: But again, some combinations might be just harder to draw than others. To account for that, I fit a fixed-effects regression on all 1,008 images: score ~ lab + animal × vehicle, plus per-lab interaction terms for pelican, bicycle, and the pelican-bicycle cell, with robust standard errors. The animal × vehicle terms absorb the inherent difficulty of all 48 combinations. The interactions measure each lab’s benchmark-specific boost relative to the average lab, with confidence intervals. The results: - Every per-lab pelican effect (the lab’s boost on pelicans across all six vehicles) lands between -0.11 and +0.14 judge points, and none comes close to significance (smallest p = 0.25). - The per-lab bicycle effects (the lab’s boost on bicycles across all eight animals) run from Grok 4.5 at -0.18 (p=0.11) to Gemini 3.5 Flash at +0.27 (p=0.022). Only Gemini clears p < 0.05, and the seven point in both directions. - No pelican-bicycle cell effect (the extra boost on the specific combination, on top of the lab’s pelican and bicycle effects) clears p < 0.05. The largest positive is GLM-5.2 at +0.35 (p=0.12), which is the one I mentioned earlier. It’s the closest thing to a signal in this experiment, but still within chance. Here are the full per-lab estimates. A pelicanmaxxing lab would show dots to the right of the zero line across its whole row: Every pelican interval and every cell interval contains zero. Exactly one doesn’t: Gemini 3.5 Flash in the bicycle column. But with 21 tests at p < 0.05, chance alone predicts about one false positive (21 × 0.05 ≈ 1.05), and one is exactly what came up. It also doesn’t survive a multiple-comparisons correction: the Bonferroni threshold across the 21 tests is 0.05/21 ≈ 0.002, and its p-value is 0.022. The full table of estimates and p-values is in the repo. But these intervals are wide, about ±0.6 judge points on average. Any boost smaller than that won’t be captured by this test. Evidence #5: The pelican-bicycle scenes don’t look memorized Some have suggested that the pelican on a bicycle looks like a memorized composition, pointing to recurring patterns such as the pelican always facing right, or recurring elements like a sun or a scarf. So I wanted to know if this was true. Direction: All 21 pelican-bicycle images, across all seven labs, face right. No other animal/vehicle combination does that. However, facing right is common: 60% of all 1,008 images do it. How common depends on the animal and the vehicle, and bicycles are one of the two vehicles where it’s strongest: | vehicle | left | right | ambiguous | |---|---|---|---| | scooter | 9% | 83% | 8% | | bicycle | 11% | 81% | 8% | | skateboard | 19% | 60% | 21% | | plane | 21% | 58% | 21% | | unicycle | 22% | 45% | 33% | | boat | 33% | 35% | 32% | Pelicans are also among the animals that tend to face right: | animal | left | right | ambiguous | |---|---|---|---| | antelope | 21% | 78% | 1% | | pelican | 22% | 78% | 0% | | heron | 22% | 77% | 1% | | whale | 34% | 65% | 1% | | flamingo | 36% | 64% | 0% | | otter | 8% | 45% | 47% | | cat | 8% | 40% | 52% | | raccoon | 3% | 36% | 61% | It’s hard to draw a pelican or a bicycle facing the viewer, so models almost always draw them from the side, facing left or right. That’s why so few of their images are ambiguous. Other combinations also come close to unanimous: antelope on a scooter and pelican on a scooter land at 20 of 21, and heron on a bicycle at 19 of 21. So 21 out of 21 doesn’t seem like an outlier. Scene elements: I let the extractor name any element it saw in the image. These are the counts: A memorized scene would show up as the same set of elements recurring picture after picture. I went looking for that, and found some combinations do tend to produce the same elements every time. Every single flamingo on a boat has a sun in it. Otters on planes wear scarves 38% of the time. Cats on bicycles get a basket 38% of the time. The pelican on a bicycle doesn’t seem to have anything particularly different about it. It just has some elements that appear more frequently, like every other animal-vehicle combination. Limitations - Using a single LLM judge for scoring. Every score here comes from one model, GPT-5.6 Luna, looking at one image at a time. I didn’t do much alignment and didn’t check how often it agrees with itself on a re-run. If a model just can’t judge a drawing reliably, none of the numbers above mean much. The judge is also from the same family as one of the contestants, GPT-5.6 Terra. However, every lab draws all 48 combinations, so a judge that happens to like one lab’s style lifts that lab’s whole grid at once. But that doesn’t change the results because this analysis only cares about the within-lab differences. - SVGmaxxing. A lab that optimized SVG generation as a whole (or a subset such as animals on vehicles) rises on every cell at once and looks identical to a lab that’s just good. Some labs, such as Google/DeepMind, openly do this. This experiment can’t detect that. - Limited budget. The whole experiment ran on roughly $80 of API credits. That capped it at 3 samples per cell, a single judge, and 7 models. This also prevented me from iterating too much on the prompts and pipeline, as with the “plane” vs. “airplane” case. Conclusion Sorry, HN haters, but there’s little evidence that AI labs are pelicanmaxxing. Or at least they’re not doing it in a plainly obvious manner. Pelicans aren’t drawn any better than other animals. Bicycles aren’t drawn any better than other vehicles. And no lab draws the combination better than its pelicans and bicycles already predict. GLM-5.2 comes closest: it has the largest boost on the exact pelican-bicycle cell, and and its first pelican-on-bicycle sample caught my eye. But the effect is small and not significant, so I wouldn’t put too much weight on it. The other thing that stands out is direction in the scene composition. All 21 pelican-bicycle images face right, the only combination in the grid where every image agrees. But it doesn’t seem that strange. Facing right is the norm across the experiment. Three other combinations land at 90% or above, and with 48 of them, I’m not surprised one reached 21 out of 21. The more plausible story is SVGmaxxing like Google/DeepMind does. Other labs might be doing it more quietly. Sadly, this experiment can’t say who’s doing it. But at least you can sleep tonight knowing that AI labs are not producing terabytes of pelicans on bicycles just to trick Simon Willison. If you want to look at the data yourself, the full pipeline is in the repo. Footnotes the practice of optimizing AI models to achieve high scores on popular benchmarks.↩︎ Citation @online{castillo2026, author = {Castillo, Dylan}, title = {Are {AI} Labs Pelicanmaxxing?}, date = {2026-07-18}, url = {https://dylancastillo.co/posts/pelicanmaxxing.html}, langid = {en} }

6

Computer and browser use in Codex (5 real examples)

Lenny's Newsletter · original → · 7/10 · AI: Claude Codex browser/computer use practical workflows
Today I’m walking you through one of my absolute favorite AI features right now: browser and computer use via Codex (the ChatGPT desktop app). I use this every single day, personally and…

Today I’m walking you through one of my absolute favorite AI features right now: browser and computer use via Codex (the ChatGPT desktop app). I use this every single day, personally and professionally, and I wanted to share the specific workflows I’ve built, the moments that surprised me, and the mental model that makes it actually click.

Listen or watch on YouTube, Spotify, or Apple Podcasts

What you’ll learn:

  1. How browser use and computer use work, and why the Codex desktop app plus Chrome extension is the combo I rely on

  2. How I use Codex to QA my onboarding flow, including exhaustive mobile testing I would never do manually

  3. Why under-prompting frontier models gets better results than detailed step-by-step instructions

  4. How my husband EJ Lawless’s persona-impersonation trick surfaces friction points I can’t see as the builder

  5. How I use browser use to get through my LinkedIn inbox without touching it myself

  6. How I had Codex shop Free People’s sale and add 10 medium-size items to my cart (breastfeeding-friendly and Hawaii-ready)

  7. How computer use can control iPhone mirroring so your Mac can technically operate your phone

  8. Three more computer-use shortcuts: filling annoying forms, creating Google Sheets mid-workflow, and managing a router


Brought to you by:

Runway—The creative AI platform for images, video, and more

Hyperagent—Deploy fleets of agents that handle real work

In this episode, we cover:

(00:00) Intro

(01:46) What browser use and computer use actually are

(03:08) Why I use Codex specifically and how the desktop app plus Chrome extension works

(04:15) Use case 1: QA testing my onboarding flow

(10:41) Results: 11 issues, one high-severity blocker, one Google Sheet with screenshots

(12:10) Use case 2: persona testing

(18:20) Use case 3: LinkedIn inbox, hands-free

(20:37) Use case 4: AI personal shopper

(23:47) Rapid-fire uses: forms, iPhone mirroring, router access from out of state, Google Docs

(26:50) Wrap-up

Tools referenced:

• Codex (ChatGPT desktop app): https://openai.com/codex

• Claude desktop app: https://claude.ai/download

• Monologue (voice dictation for AI): https://monologue.app

• iPhone mirroring (Apple): https://support.apple.com/en-us/111775

• Google Sheets: https://sheets.google.com

Other reference:

• Jesse Genet episode (How I AI): https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/5-openclaw-agents-run-my-home-finances?utm_source=publication-search

Where to find Claire Vo:

ChatPRD: https://www.chatprd.ai/

Website: https://clairevo.com/

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/clairevo/

X: https://x.com/clairevo

Production and marketing by https://penname.co/. For inquiries about sponsoring the podcast, email jordan@penname.co.

7

Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing?

Simon Willison · original → · 7/10 · AI: pelican benchmark analysis and AI lab optimization
22nd July 2026 - Link Blog Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing? (via) Excellent piece of work by Dylan Castillo, who took a deep-dive into the frequently pondered question of whether the AI labs have been…

22nd July 2026 - Link Blog Are AI labs pelicanmaxxing? (via) Excellent piece of work by Dylan Castillo, who took a deep-dive into the frequently pondered question of whether the AI labs have been deliberately training models to draw pelicans riding bicycles in response to my deeply unscientific benchmark. I've been randomly spot-checking this in the past by testing models against other animals riding other types of vehicle, but never with anything close to the diligence of Dylan's methodology here. Dylan took 8 animals × 6 vehicles = 48 prompts and ran them three times each through 7 different models ( GPT-5.6 Terra, Claude Sonnet 5, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Grok 4.5, Qwen3.7-Max, GLM-5.2, and DeepSeek V4 Pro). He then used GPT-5.6 Luna and Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite to help evaluate the results. There's a neat filter view for exploring the results: For the models he tested he could find no evidence of pelimaxxing: - The pelicans on bicycles don’t look any better - Labs are not better at drawing pelicans - Labs are not better at drawing bicycles - Labs are not better at drawing pelicans on bicycles, even adjusting for difficulty - The pelican-bicycle scenes don’t look memorized [...] Pelicans aren’t drawn any better than other animals. Bicycles aren’t drawn any better than other vehicles. And no lab draws the combination better than its pelicans and bicycles already predict. GLM-5.2 comes closest: it has the largest boost on the exact pelican-bicycle cell, and and its first pelican-on-bicycle sample caught my eye. But the effect is small and not significant, so I wouldn’t put too much weight on it. Recent articles - OpenAI’s accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened - 22nd July 2026 - A Fireside Chat with Cat and Thariq from the Claude Code team - 21st July 2026 - Kimi K3, and what we can still learn from the pelican benchmark - 16th July 2026

Items scoring 7/10 or above from 11 sources, scored by claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 on relevance to my interests. At most 3 per source.

Scoring categories & sources
  1. Local Wexford or South East Ireland news
  2. Irish or EU-wide affairs affecting citizens broadly: elections, new laws or policy being debated, cost of living, education — especially impacts on mid-life adults or teenagers. Never courts/crime stories.
  3. Irish news on a topic relevant to my interests
  4. Work and tech topics: networking, AI, Kubernetes, platforms, SaaS
  5. AI news including critical or anti-AI perspectives
  6. Gaming: PC gaming, indie gaming, retro gaming
  7. General interests: gardening, woodwork, cycling, fitness, travel
  8. Comics

Sources: Breaking News Ireland, Wexford Local, Hacker News, r/gaming, r/pcgaming, r/antiAI, r/indiegaming, Lenny's Newsletter, One Useful Thing, Newcomer, Simon Willison

Comics

Calibration Nobel

XKCD · view →
We would like to once again apologize to Dr. Jones for last year

We would like to once again apologize to Dr. Jones for last year